Board of Contract Appeals

                 General Services Administration

                      Washington, D.C. 20405

      

                      _____________________



                          April 20, 2005

                      _____________________





                         GSBCA 16543-RELO



                 In the Matter of DOUGLAS TASTAD





     Douglas Tastad, Yorktown, VA, Claimant.



     Michael T. Hosang, Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, United States Army

Transportation Center, Fort Eustis, VA, appearing for Department of the Army.  



NEILL, Board Judge.



     In the late summer of 2004, Mr. Douglas Tastad, a civilian employee of the Army,

underwent a permanent change of station move from the Washington, D.C., area to

Yorktown, Virginia.  In connection with the purchase of a residence at his new duty station,

Mr. Tastad incurred certain expenses for which the Army has declined to reimburse him.  He

asks that we review for correctness the Army's refusal to pay his claim for these expenses. 



     The four expenses in contention in this case are a tax service fee of $45, a tax set-up

fee of $7, a property inspection waiver fee of $50, and a courier fee of $15.  We consider

each expense in the order presented. 



     The tax service fee of $45 and the tax set-up fee of $7 are both shown on the

settlement sheet for the purchase of Mr. Tastad's residence in Yorktown as "Items Payable

in Connection with Loan."  We have consistently looked upon such fees as paid incident to

and as a prerequisite to the extension of credit.  As such, each fee is deemed to be a finance

charge, as that term is defined in the Truth in Lending Act and by Regulation Z issued by the

Federal Reserve Board, 12 CFR 226 (2004).  Daniel H. Coney, GSBCA 15506-RELO, 01-2

BCA   31,610.  Mr. Tastad, as a civilian employee of the Department of Defense (DOD), is

subject to the Department's Joint Travel Regulations (JTR).  According to the JTR, DOD

does not have the authority to reimburse a fee that is part of the finance charge unless

reimbursement is specifically authorized by the regulations.  The JTR does not specifically

authorize reimbursement for either fee.  JTR C14002; Roxanna E. Zamora, GSBCA 16562-

RELO (Mar. 4, 2005); Kerry M. Kennedy, GSBCA 16540-RELO, 05-1 BCA   32,877; Larry

W. Poole, GSBCA 15730-RELO, 02-1 BCA   31,776.   



      Although aware of the Board's previous decisions upholding denial of reimbursement

of finance charges, Mr. Tastad contends that, in his case, reimbursement is still permissible

because the settlement sheet shows that the two tax fees in question were not paid to his

creditor, but rather, to a tax service company.  Mr. Tastad believes that a "finance charge,"

as defined in the Truth in Lending Act and by Regulation Z, is one imposed by the creditor

and, therefore, payable only to the creditor as an incident to the extension of credit.  We

disagree.  The term "finance charge," as defined in Regulation Z, is said to include any

charge payable "directly or indirectly" and imposed "directly or indirectly" by the creditor. 

12 CFR 226.4(a).  Payment of the fee to a tax service company rather than directly to the

creditor does not make an otherwise non-reimbursable expense reimbursable.  Terry L. Hood,

GSBCA 16061-RELO, 03-2 BCA   32,314.  



     Mr. Tastad's rationale for reimbursement of the property inspection waiver fee of $50

is less than convincing.  He directs us to JTR C14002-A.4.a(11), which provides that

expenses in connection with property inspection fees, when required by law or by a lender,

are reimbursable.  Mr. Tastad explains that because of his excellent credit worthiness, he was

permitted to pay this waiver fee rather than incur the much greater expense of a property

appraisal.  We find claimant's reliance on the above-cited JTR provision misplaced.  We

agree with the agency that the JTR provision cannot be read as applying to an inspection

which was never made and which, rather than being required by law or the lender, has, in

fact, been waived.  



     In view of the circumstances relating to Mr. Tastad's claim of $15 for a courier's

charges, we are persuaded that he should be reimbursed for this expense.  Claimant explains

that, at the time of closing on his residence at Yorktown, the sellers of the house had already

left the state.  The title company presiding over the settlement, therefore, made use of a

courier to ensure that documents were signed promptly and by all parties.  We have in the

past allowed reimbursement of reasonable courier fees when the claimant can demonstrate

that use of the courier was prompted by more than mere considerations of personal

convenience and when it is clear that the fee was incurred either by claimant or someone

working on his or her behalf and not by the creditor.  See Kathy D. Peter, GSBCA 16114-

RELO, 04-1 BCA   32,424 (2003) (and cases cited therein).  We find those requirements

have been met here.       











                             Decision



     The agency's denial of Mr. Tastad's claims for reimbursement of a tax service fee, a

tax set-up fee, and a property inspection waiver fee of $50 is affirmed.  Mr. Tastad's claim

for reimbursement of a courier fee is granted.  





                                        ___________________________

                                        EDWIN B. NEILL 

                                        Board Judge