Board of Contract Appeals

                 General Services Administration

                      Washington, D.C. 20405







                       __________________

                                

                        January 29, 2003

                       __________________

                                

                                

                        GSBCA 16027-RELO

                                

                                

              In the Matter of GEORGE R. SAULSBERY





     George R. Saulsbery, APO Area Europe, Claimant.



     Charles T. Ketchel, Jr., Military Law Division, Office of the Staff Judge Advocate,

United States Air Forces in Europe, Ramstein Air Base, Germany, appearing for Department

of the Air Force.



BORWICK, Board Judge.



     Claimant, a separated federal employee who used to work for the Department of the

Air Force, asks this Board to decide that he is entitled to an extension of his return travel

rights to the United States beyond the two-year maximum period from his separation date

that was granted by the agency.  



     The agency moves to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.  The agency argues that claimant

has not filed a claim for incurred expenses as required by the applicable statute.  The agency

also argues that claimant may not seek an advisory opinion on the correctness of the agency's

action in denying return travel rights beyond the two-year period.  For the reasons stated

below, we deny the agency's motion to dismiss.  Claimant has a concrete, non-hypothetical

intention to incur relocation expenses.  We find claimant's circumstances meet jurisdictional

requirements of statute and our case law.  We deny the claim, however, as the Joint Travel

Regulations (JTR) make the two-year period the maximum period for exercise of return

travel rights.  The two-year period may not be enlarged even for urgent personal

circumstances.    



     The facts are as follows:  Claimant terminated his federal employment with the agency

on January 31, 2001.   Claimant resided in the United Kingdom with his family.  Because of

a family emergency, claimant requested from the agency, and received, permission to use his

return travel entitlements up to two-years from his date of separation, i.e. until January 31,

2003.  Because of another family emergency, claimant, on November 14, 2002, requested a

further extension to use his entitlements until January 31, 2004.  On December 11, claimant's

request for an additional extension was denied by the commander of the installation where

claimant had been employed because regulation did not permit another extension.  The

commander advised claimant that he could petition this Board for a decision on whether

claimant could be reimbursed if he moved after the two-year limitation.  



     The agency now moves for dismissal of this matter, arguing that the Board lacks

jurisdiction because claimant does not have a "claim" within the meaning of the authorizing

statute, 31 U.S.C.   3702 (2000).  The agency notes that claimant has not as yet incurred

expenses arising from a move from the United Kingdom.  The agency also argues that only

an agency head or disbursing or paying official may request an advisory opinion under the

governing statute, 31 U.S.C.   3529, and that since claimant has not submitted a voucher

claiming expenses, no disbursing or paying official has requested such an opinion.

  

     Statute provides:



     The Administrator of General Services shall settle claims involving expenses

     incurred by Federal civilian employees for official travel and transportation,

     and for relocation expenses incident to transfers of official duty station.



31 U.S.C.   3702(a)(3).  We believe that the agency's reading of the statute is restrictive.  We

have decided requests for an extension of time for relocation entitlements when a claimant

has shown a definite and concrete intention to incur specific expenses, but has been denied

the opportunity to be reimbursed for the expense by the agency because the agency has

refused an extension of time for exercise of those entitlements.  See, e.g., Michele A. Fennell,

GSBCA 16015-RELO (Jan. 22, 2003); Stephanie P. Riddle, GSBCA 15027-RELO, 99-2

BCA   30,533.  We, however, do not have jurisdiction over purely hypothetical cases.  John

R. Durant, GSBCA 15726-TRAV, 02-1 BCA   31,827.  Based on the record before us, we

conclude that claimant has a definite and concrete intent to incur relocation expenses after

January 31, 2003, but the agency's refusal to extend the time has frustrated any possibility of

reimbursement.  The agency's motion to dismiss is denied. 



     We turn to the merits of the issue presented.  The JTR state that an Outside of the

Continental United States (OCONUS) activity may authorize a reasonable delay of ninety

days or less for separating employee to exercise their return travel rights and that the 

OCONUS activity may grant separating employees "up to" two years from the date of

separation for exercise of those return rights.  JTR C4202-B.  That two-year period is a

maximum, which may not be enlarged, even for exigent personal circumstances.  Patrick R.

Gillen, GSBCA 15748-RELO, 02-2 BCA   31,869; Sherrell M. Garth, GSBCA 15729-

RELO, 02-1 BCA   31,778.  Here, the agency generously authorized claimant the full

allowable two-year period of delay to use his return rights.  The agency is not allowed to

authorize further delay.



     The claim is denied.  







                                        __________________________

                                        ANTHONY S. BORWICK

                                        Board Judge